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Pragmatist Aesthetics: Histories,
Questions, and Consequences
An Interview with Richard Shusterman
Richard Shusterman and Roberta Dreon
 Roberta DREON -  Richard Shusterman is one of the leading figures in the current field of
pragmatist  aesthetics  and  he  has  undoubtedly  played  a  pivotal  role  in  recovering  a
pragmatist  approach  to  aesthetics.  His  book  Pragmatist Aesthetics was  simultaneously
published in  France under  the  title  L’Art  à  l’état  vif.  La  pensée  pragmatiste  et  l’esthétique
populaire in 1992, paving the way for a long awaited French translation of Dewey’s Art as
Experience (Dewey 1989)  in  2010 (Dewey 2005/2010),  beautifully  edited  by  Jean-Pierre
Cometti. Shusterman’s work further developed into an explicit claim in favor of philosophy
as  a  way  of  life  and  finally  led  to  somaesthetics,  an  original  proposal  within  the
contemporary  debate,  producing a strongly  practical  turn in  the embodied trend within
contemporary philosophy.
 In reconstructing your development of a pragmatist approach to aesthetics, you state that
your first reading of Dewey’s 1934 volume was not decisive. Rather, you emphasize the
importance of Richard Rorty’s and Joseph Margolis’s departures from analytic philosophy,
which  led  you  to  consider  continental  philosophy  a  resource  and  to  find  a  plausible
alternative for developing a non-foundational approach in philosophy “under the banner of a
renewed  pragmatism”  (Shusterman  2014:  23).  What,  if  any,  are  the  advantages  of
pragmatist aesthetics as a third way between the analytic philosophy of art and continental
aesthetics  –  notwithstanding  the  fact  that  it  is  a  huge  field  in  itself  with  different,
sometimes even conflicting positions? 
Richard SHUSTERMAN - Since you mention the late Jean-Pierre Cometti in passing, let
me pause for a moment to emphasize how important he was for the reception of
pragmatism in France. His contribution went far beyond his French translation of
Dewey’s Art as Experience, for which he engaged a number of good translators to help
him complete the job. He even enlisted me to write the preface to this French edition
(Shusterman 2005/2010).  To be precise,  this  French edition was first  published in
2005 by Éditions Farrago together with the University of Pau Press,  but was later
republished  by  Gallimard.  However,  before  translating  Dewey’s  aesthetics,  Jean-
Pierre  Cometti  had  already  translated  works  of  neopragmatists:  Rorty,  Putnam,
Goodman, and me. He also wrote an excellent book on pragmatism for Gallimard,
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which had an impressive chapter on pragmatist aesthetics that included an insightful
discussion of somaesthetics (Cometti 2010). 
Today it is hard to imagine how difficult it was in the 1990s to find a French publisher
willing to publish Dewey’s aesthetic masterpiece. When I first came to Paris in 1990,
invited by Pierre Bourdieu, I tried to convince him to publish Art as Experience in his
collection with Minuit. He said it was out of the question because Dewey’s tastes in
art were far too old fashioned for Parisian intellectual tastes, and that they were even
too old-fashioned when Dewey published the book in 1934. I also tried to convince
Gerard Genette, the influential literary theorist who had a book series with Le Seuil
and  had  successfully  published  some  of  Arthur  Danto’s  books  in  aesthetics.  If
Bourdieu rejected Art as Experience as demodé, Genette regarded it as too longwinded
(his expression was trop bavard). Frustrated by the failure to find a French publisher
for Dewey’s aesthetics, I had the consolation that the Dewey-inspired book I was then
writing on pragmatist aesthetics was contemporary enough (with its study of rap) to
interest  Jerome  Lindon  of  Minuit,  who  eventually  published  it  in  January  1992.
However, Lindon insisted on removing three of my book’s more technical chapters
(on interpretation and ontology), which he thought were too narrowly specialized
and demanding to interest a sufficient number of French readers. He also insisted
that pragmatism not figure in the book’s title, which came to be L’Art à l’état vif. I
trusted his publishing experience and the book proved popular enough to reach a
wide audience, even the TV audience of M-6’s Rapline, which interviewed me about
the book. It was only after the publication of L’Art à l’état vif that I met Jean-Pierre
Cometti and, later, other French philosophers interested in American philosophy.
Since we are doing this interview for the European Journal of Pragmatism and American
Philosophy, I take this opportunity to express my respect for the French pragmatists.
It has been my privilege to work closely with them, not only on philosophical projects
but also on artistic ones. Through them, I had the opportunity of doing pragmatist
aesthetics in practice by curating an art show in Paris (Shusterman 2012a). I could
also share with them my experimental work in performance art, much of which took
place in and around Paris. Those aesthetic experiences of performance prompted me
to  write  a  bilingual  philosophical  novella,  The  Adventures  of  the  Man  in  Gold/Les
Aventures de l’homme en or –  illustrated with images from those performances and
published  in  Paris  (Shusterman  2016a)  –  as  another  experiment  in  pragmatist
aesthetics. This hybrid, illustrated book constitutes an experiment in trying to find
new ways (verbal and nonverbal) of communicating philosophical ideas I regard as
central to aesthetics, to somaesthetics, and to the pragmatist idea of philosophy as an
embodied  art  of  living.  (Of  course,  philosophers  like  Diderot  and  Voltaire  were
already philosophizing through fiction in the eighteenth century, so I make no claim
to novelty; and I’d like to believe that Paris remains a place in our conservative world
where there remains a spirit of intellectual experimentation.) In any case, I regard
such experiments in artistic practice and aesthetic experience as central to my work
in pragmatism. One might characterize these performative and literary experiments
as belonging to a “poetic pragmatism,” though I know that some colleagues reject
them as far beyond the borders of philosophy. My own understanding of the spirit of
pragmatist experimentalism involves a probing or testing the borders of academic
philosophy,  with sincere  respect  for  academic  discipline  but  without  slavish
conformism to all its standard conventions and territorial boundaries.
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This point leads me back, finally, to your initial question about the academic fields of
analytic, continental, and pragmatist philosophy. It was long ago, back in the late
1980s and early 1990s, when I proposed pragmatist aesthetics as a third way that
avoids the aridness of  analytic aesthetics and the excesses and obscurity of  some
fashionable  continental  theory  at  that  time.  My  purpose  was  clearly  partisan  or
political: to create greater recognition, in the Anglo-American philosophical field, of
the value of pragmatism for aesthetics and the philosophy of art, particularly for the
value of Dewey’s aesthetics, which analytic aesthetics had dismissed and continental
theory largely ignored. Today, I would not advocate for pragmatism precisely in that
way, although I remain convinced that classical and contemporary pragmatists have
many useful things to say about aesthetics. The current philosophical field is not the
same;  analytic  aesthetics  and continental  theory are  not  what  they were  in  1990
when I pleaded for pragmatist aesthetics. By now pragmatism has also won a secure
place in aesthetics and needs no special pleading. In addition, pragmatist aesthetics
today is a broad field with multiple and diverse voices, so it is difficult to generalize
about pragmatist aesthetics as if it had a defining essence. 
There is still another danger in reifying the notion of pragmatist aesthetics as if it
were a well-defined movement or school that is competing with rival schools. This
danger  is  sectarianism,  which  I  think  can  encourage  conformism and impair  the
freedom  of  thought  that  I  believe  is  important  for  philosophical  thinking.  I
acknowledge that identifying one’s thought with a philosophical school or tradition
is a natural and perhaps necessary response to deep psychological and professional
needs.  It  is  practically  impossible  to  find a  job  in  philosophy these  days  without
declaring one’s allegiance to one philosophical school or another. I am very grateful
that there is a journal like EJPAP, which is hosting this interview and which serves
the interests of philosophers like myself who identify with the pragmatist tradition.
However, today I would refrain from explicitly pitting pragmatist aesthetics against
other approaches; indeed my own work has always sought to incorporate thinkers
outside the pragmatist field (including analytic and continental philosophy). Let me
conclude this response by invoking the undisputed source of pragmatist aesthetics,
John Dewey, who (for good reasons, as I’ve often noted), not only never used the term
“pragmatism” in Art of Experience but even explicitly (and repeatedly) rejected the
notion of pragmatist aesthetics after its publication (Shusterman 2014).
⁂
 Roberta DREON - As you often state, Dewey’s aesthetics was deeply rooted in his conception
of  experience.  His  view  of  experience  rejected  subjectivist,  dualistic,  and  atomistic
conceptions of experience, including the empiricist one (Dewey 1980 and James 1976), and
rested  on  a  strongly  naturalistic  foundation  which  he  originally  derived  from  Darwin.
Famously, this aspect of Dewey’s reflection was rejected by Rorty, who saw a metaphysical
residue in it that should be abandoned in a post-dogmatic, non-foundational approach to
philosophy. Do the naturalistic, albeit not reductive, roots of Dewey’s aesthetics still play a
role  in  your  pragmatist  aesthetics,  even though you have never  worked out  an explicit
theory of experience? And, if so, does your own proposal fall within Rorty’s objection?
Richard  SHUSTERMAN -  Yes,  my  philosophical  stance  is  naturalistic,  not  only  in
aesthetics  and  somaesthetics,  but  also  in  philosophy  of  mind  and  culture.  In
Pragmatist  Aesthetics,  I  defended  Dewey’s  aesthetic  naturalism,  while  in  Body
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Consciousness (Shusterman  2008),  I  defend  and  elaborate  on  Dewey’s  naturalist,
emergent  account  of  mind.  I  also  share  a  naturalistic  view  of  culture  as  both
emerging  from  nature  and  reciprocally  shaping  nature,  including  human  nature,
even in its physical dimensions (Shusterman 2002). However, I don’t understand why
having a naturalistic stance requires formulating a systematic or explicit theory of
experience  as  Dewey did.  Rorty’s  naturalism comes  with  a  radical  repudiation of
experience as something we should not theorize about but rather should exclude
altogether from our philosophical thinking. I think this total exclusion is misguided,
even if I believe that some of Dewey’s uses of experience are questionable. One of the
things I deeply appreciate in Dewey’s account of experience is the need to recognize
our human weakness and vulnerability vis-à-vis the precariousness of experience.
Our experience is  essentially precarious because we live “in a world which is  not
finished and which has not consistently made up its mind where it is going and what
it is going to do” (Dewey 1988a: 67). Experience continuously threatens us with new
challenges (like the unforeseen Covid pandemic), and Dewey wisely realizes that it is
compensatory arrogance to think that we can master this unfathomable flux with
fixed metaphysical categories or conceptual, linguistic capacities. Recognition of our
vulnerability as mortal,  sentient flesh is one reason why I could never accept the
limits of Rorty’s textualism. His textualism (with its poetics of self-creation) strikes
me  as  a  compensatory  escape  into  the  reassuring  comfort  of  sentences  whose
syntactic  and  semantic  rules  we  know  and  master,  and  whose  beautiful  textual
compositions do not suffer as we do from injury, disease, and death. These forms of
suffering we experience most clearly through our bodies, which is why philosophy
always sought an existence for the soul beyond our somatic mortality, as well as a
certainty  of  truth  beyond  our  fallible  knowledge.  My  insistence  that  philosophy
should take the body and its nondiscursive experience seriously (and thereby address
our  human  limits  and  weakness,  even  if  we  also  try  to  improve  our  somatic
conditions)  could  be  one  reason  for  Rorty’s  vehement  criticism  of  somaesthetics
(Rorty 2001). Somaesthetics is a threat to Rorty’s compensatory textual retreat (from
the  often-brutal  meaninglessness  and  disappointments  of  experience)  into  the
immortal  life  of  literature,  an  attractive  substitute  for  religion’s  promise  of
immortality. Because I advocate philosophy as an embodied art of living that involves
a melioristic dimension of reshaping the self (as you rightly noted in your opening
remarks, one might call my position a poetic pragmatism that differs from Rorty’s
pragmatism of  “the strong poet” (Rorty 1989).  To sum up,  my position regarding
experience is obviously closer to Dewey than to Rorty, though I have found traces of
the  myth  of  the  given  in  Dewey’s  claim  –  evident in  his  “Qualitative  Thought”
(Dewey 1984) and his Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (Dewey 1986) – that a unifying felt
quality  is  necessary  to  all  thinking.  I  shy  away  from  using  experience  as  an
epistemological foundation necessary for the truth, meaning, and coherence of every
possible thought, but recognize experience as a useful orientation or direction for
aesthetic and practical enhancement in personal, social, and environmental contexts.
I  will  not try to explain or defend my nuanced position here – you can find it in
Practicing Philosophy (Shusterman 1997) and Thinking through the Body (Shusterman
2012b). Instead, I refer readers to an excellent article by Mathias Girel (Girel 2015)
that arbitrates this issue between Dewey, Rorty, Brandom, and myself. I should also
note an article where I elucidate the concept of “transactional experiential inquiry”
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as  a  key  methodological  orientation  in  my  research  that  relates  to  the  logic  of
discovery (Shusterman 2015).
⁂
 Roberta DREON -  Your transition from a pragmatist aesthetics to somaesthetics occurred
through your book Practicing Philosophy (Shusterman 1997). It coincides with the claim that
we should recover the ancient idea of philosophy as a concrete way of life beyond or next
to philosophy as a primarily theoretical enterprise, concerning the development of a general
form of knowledge and/or criticism about the world and its different aspects. It is clear that
your somaesthetics – conceived of as “the critical study of one’s own body and the art of
cultivating it for improving its experience and use” (Shusterman 2019a: 216) – is a way of
practicing philosophy and not only an intellectual proposal. In this view, one might see and
attempt  to  recover  the  melioristic  idea  of  philosophy  pursued  by  Thoreau  and  the
Pragmatists: a theory should be assumed or dismissed because of the consequences it
can have on one’s  practical  life  (James 1978)  and possibly  because of  its  capacity  to
improve individual and shared life (Dewey 1988a). However, as you will recall, this is not an
exclusively pragmatist point: it can already be found in ancient thought, among Greek and
Latin philosophers as well as in Confucius, who has increasingly become a source for your
proposal. So what is the main pragmatist heritage in somaesthetics, beyond the idea (now
relatively widespread) that the self is fully embodied?
Richard SHUSTERMAN - Please excuse me for making two points of precision that may
seem trivial  but I  consider important.  First,  it  would be wrong to understand the
move to  somaesthetics  as  a  departure  from pragmatist  aesthetics.  It  is  rather  an
extension  of  pragmatist  aesthetics,  the  fulfilment  of  a  project  that  was  already
indicated in the final pages of the first edition of Pragmatist Aesthetics in 1992, which
argue for our needing an aesthetic of “bodily practices” that “aesthetically enrich our
lives in terms of an enhanced quality and awareness of felt experience” (Shusterman
1992: 261). Second, Practicing Philosophy is only the first (English) publication where I
noted the transition; it is not where the transition occurred. The transition occurred
through my experience of practicing certain somatic disciplines and my reflection on
the  experience  of  those  disciplines  and  on  the  theories  that  guided  them.  The
experience of real practice is essential to the way I understand pragmatist aesthetics
and somaesthetics. It is not surprising therefore that people can understand my work
better when they are better acquainted with its roots in practice. This is one reason
why I give practical workshops in somaesthetics. Unfortunately, the institutions who
invite me for such workshops have never been philosophy departments, but instead
departments  in  the  arts,  design,  technology,  or  health  studies.  Those  other
departments have much larger budgets to fund such workshops, so I am reluctant to
conclude that philosophers would not like those practical workshops.
Now to go deeper into your question. You are right that I certainly know the idea of
philosophy as  an embodied way of  life  is  very ancient,  existing long before  both
pragmatism and somaesthetics. That was why I explicitly introduced somaesthetics
(adopting James’s description of pragmatism) as “a new name for certain old ways of
thinking” (Shusterman 2000: 263). I don’t believe there needs to be what you call an
“exclusively  pragmatist  point”  in  somaesthetics;  in  fact,  to  seek  or  demand such
exclusivity would be to court the sectarianism that I think is foreign to the pluralist,
boundary-challenging spirit of the pragmatist thinking I most admire. Nonetheless,
pragmatism has certainly shaped the field of somaesthetics in important ways. The
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main pragmatist heritage in somaesthetics (besides the affirmation of embodiment
that is very powerful in James and Dewey) derives from two key pragmatist ideas
that, again, are not exclusive to pragmatism but extremely central to it. The first you
already mentioned – meliorism. I defined somaesthetics “as the critical, meliorative
study  of  the  experience  and  use  of  one’s  body  as  a  locus  of  sensory-aesthetic
appreciation (aisthesis) and creative self-fashioning. It is therefore also devoted to the
knowledge, discourses, practices, and bodily disciplines that structure such somatic
care or can improve it” (Shusterman 2000: 267). 
The second key pragmatist idea that is crucial to somaesthetics is the importance of
practice and the essential integration of theory and practice. Already when I first
outlined  the  three  branches  of  somaesthetics,  two  of  those  branches  focused  on
practice.  One  was  pragmatic  somaesthetics  –  which  involves  the  proposal  and
critique of various practical methods or disciplines to improve somatic experience
(including critique of the values and beliefs presupposed by those methods) – and the
other was practical somaesthetics, which is the actual, physical practicing of such
somatic  methods  or  disciplines.  As  I  mentioned  earlier,  this  dimension  of  actual
practice is extremely important to my conception of somaesthetics. As a matter of
personal  fact,  I  could  not  have  written  my  books  on  somaesthetics  without  the
practical experience and professional training I had as a somatic therapist. Nor could
I have written what I did about photography and performance without the practical
experience of working in performance art with an expert photographic artist, Yann
Toma.  The  papers  I  have  published  on  somaesthetics  and  interactive  design  (co-
authored  with  experts  in  human-computer  interactive  technology)  all  developed
from practical workshops with their design groups (Lee 2014; Eriksson et al. 2020).
This  organic  extension  of  philosophical  theory  into  practical,  interdisciplinary
collaboration rather than confining one’s philosophical work to purely philosophical
projects is something that I admire in the pragmatist tradition, though again, it is not
exclusive to pragmatism.
⁂
 Roberta  DREON -  A  further  searing  issue  concerns  the  political  implications  of
somaesthetics. The problem has been already posed to you and you have already given
some answers on this topic, but it deserves further discussion, given the importance of the
issue at stake. Very succinctly, the objection is that somaesthetics as cultivation of one’s
own body consciousness and possibilities is individualistic, and that it could ultimately be
interpreted as an escape into the private sphere and as involving,  if  only  unwittingly,  a
confirmation and a reinforcement of neo-liberal  politics and economics.  Your answer is
based on a couple of characteristically pragmatist points: on the one hand, the idea that
one’s  own  self  and  identity  is  socially  configured  and,  on  the  other,  the  belief  that
democracy is not merely a rational, deliberative, and normative affair. Rather, it concerns a
fully embodied community, as we too have emphasized in this journal (see EJPAP 2/2020).
By further developing this background, you have drawn an argument from both Confucius
and  Plato  regarding  individual  action  in  politics:  good  governance  of  the  community
requires good governance of one’s own self as a prerequisite – “the macro-field of political
government is essentially based on the micro-field of self-government” (Shusterman 2019a:
218). Incidentally, we could also mention one of the founding text of the Western tradition
in aesthetics, namely the Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man,  where Schiller claims
that, in order to build a new, more democratic and balanced form of government, humans
should  pursue a  mutual  regulation of  rational  impulses and sensual  drives  through an
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education to beauty as “living form.” However, I am not fully persuaded by your argument
for  a  series of  reasons:  there is  a  tension,  I  believe,  between your  emphasizing that  –
coherently with Dewey and Mead – the self is shaped through its social transactions, and
your assuming with Confucius and Plato that the cultivation of one’s own self and body is
the premise for managing community life. Where does this cultivation occur if not within
the  complex  network  of  already  social  relationships?  Furthermore,  in  what  existential
conditions  –  including social,  economic,  political,  and  symbolic  factors  –  can  the
cultivation of one’s own embodied self take place? Probably, only within economically and/
or  intellectually  privileged  situations.  If  this  is  true,  somaesthetics  would  unwittingly
reinforce a form of elitism, which is far from pragmatism.
Richard SHUSTERMAN -  I  share your appreciation of Schiller’s Letters on the Aesthetic
Education of Man. The sixth chapter of Pragmatist Aesthetics involves a close reading of
that work in conjunction with T.S. Eliot’s “Portrait of a Lady.” I have already dealt at
length with the stale objections that any concern for the body involves a retreat from
the social, a flight into private egotism. Our soma, as the locus of our presence in the
world, is where we typically interact in the social sphere; our bodies are very often
more public than our minds and thoughts. Because the soma is a transactional entity
that  exists  and  thrives  only  through  engagement  with  its  physical  and  social
environment,  somaesthetic  perception  and  cultivation  (when  properly  pursued)
always involve the perception of its environment, and a consequent concern for it.
You cannot feel your body alone; you always feel it with what it stands, sits, or lies
on; with the force of gravity or layer of clothes that cover it; or with the surrounding
air that cools it or enters its lungs. 
As  for  the  polemics  about  the  relationship  between  self-government  and  socio-
political government, you seem to misunderstand me. More importantly, I think your
remarks about Confucius and Plato are misleading. We should characterize neither of
these great thinkers as advocating that personal individualism is more basic or more
important than society. I too am remote from the methodological individualism that
denies society’s essential, formative role in molding the habits, thoughts, and values
of  individuals.  As  you  recognize,  I  take  the  holist  view  that  individuals  are
fundamentally  shaped by  social  relations,  even in  apparently  personal  or  private
areas such as taste. (This concern for the social was the reason for my work with
Bourdieu,  who offered  a  more  contemporary  and empirically  detailed  account  of
social relations than I found in Dewey.) 
Appreciating methodological holism and its insistence on the social construction of
individuals  does  not  however  negate  the  importance  of  also  focusing  on  the
individual and her body-governance for achieving better government of society at
large. The calamity of the Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted the crucial importance
of individual responsibility for bodily care as necessary for the good of society as a
whole.  Governments  can legislate  orders  for  wearing masks,  washing hands,  self-
quarantine, social distancing, etc. But these orders are useless if individuals do not
embrace  that  bodily  behavior  as  self-government.  Moreover,  what  is  key  to  the
Chinese conception is that such self-government should begin with the leaders. They
need to set the example for other individuals to follow in the self-government of
harmonious and ethically attractive behavior. We have seen, all too often during the
Covid  pandemic,  how  leaders  by  not  governing  themselves  in  mask  wearing,
confinement,  and  social  distancing  have  undermined  the  public’s  faith  and
cooperation,  and  have  thus  rendered  general  governmental  policies  far  more
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ineffective.  Since your question may create a misperception of Confucianism, and
since the article of mine from which you cite is in French (which may be an obstacle
to most readers of our interview), please allow me to cite from that article’s English
version  of  the  Confucian  conception  of  the  self  and  of  the  idea  of  somaesthetic
cultivation that emerges from it. 
Confucianism  insists  rather  that  the  individual  self  is  essentially  socially
constructed. The particular self is defined by the various social relations that shape
it. One is the son of M and F, the student of X, the classmate of Y, the teacher of Z,
the father of A and B, the husband of W, and so on. These social roles orient one’s
self-cultivation  and  determine  the  direction  of  one’s  self-realization.  Self-
cultivation is always socially situated, and somatic self-cultivation is significantly
shaped by one’s social roles and duties. Consider, for example, an argument that
Mencius brings for somatic self-care and self-cultivation. Recognizing the primacy
of one’s duty to one’s parents, Mencius maintains that satisfying that duty requires
fulfilling a prior trust to one’s own body or self. “I have heard of those who, having
kept their bodies inviolate, could serve their parents, but not of those who failing to
do so, still served their parents. Whichever duty I fail to perform, it must not be my
duty to my parents, for that is the duty from which all others spring. Whichever
trust I fail to fulfill, it must not be that of keeping my body inviolate, for that is the
trust  from  which  others  arise.”  In  other  words,  duties  to  the  self  are  logically
implicated in our duties to others, just as our relations to others essentially define
the self. (Shusterman 2019a: 218-9)
Of course, it is true that people with more leisure and money can afford to take more
time  for  somatic  self-cultivation.  However,  this  holds  for  all  sorts of  projects  of
improvement.  It  is  not  an  argument  against  somaesthetics  per  se;  in  fact,  the
argument has more power against cultivation in the arts and sciences, literature and
philosophy – fields that require special conditions of access to materials and high
levels of education. Not everyone can afford to live in New York or Paris and visit the
museums and art festivals there, or can afford to purchase tickets to the Opera, or
have  the  time,  energy,  and  literary  competence  to  cultivate  oneself  with  Proust,
Joyce, or even Thomas Mann. But everybody has a soma with the ability to breathe
and thus to cultivate one’s breathing.  Most of  us can walk and thus can learn to
notice how we walk and how we could improve the satisfaction we can get from
walking by monitoring and adjusting its particular forms and rhythms, its ways of
engaging our limbs, head, torso, and pelvis, as well as our feet. This may all sound like
mystical malarkey to theorists for whom somatic thinking is a contradiction in terms.
I know that it sometimes takes more than verbal arguments like this one to bring
skeptics  to  appreciate  the  somaesthetic  point  of  view.  Sometimes  it  takes  the
experience of a practical workshop to produce the change of perspective. 
⁂
 Roberta DREON - In a recent paper, entitled “The Invention of Pragmatist Aesthetic,” you claim
that  “the  notion  of  pragmatist  aesthetics  (though  undeniably  inspired  by  Dewey)  is
essentially  the  product  of  neopragmatist  thought,  and  that  the  term  gained  wide,
international  currency only  after  it  began to be employed and promoted systematically
through the publication of my book, Pragmatist Aesthetics (1992).” Although it is maybe true
that you have coined the term, it seems that the variety of uses of the pragmatist heritage
in aesthetics is much broader and more multifaceted, as it also appears from this issue of
our journal. Environmental aesthetics, everyday aesthetics, the American tradition of social
aesthetics, the conception of aesthetics as philosophy of culture – all of these trends seem
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to share important connections with Dewey’s view of experience and the uses of artistic
practices within human life. Does not your above-mentioned view run the risk of simplifying
the picture  and of  failing to  adopt  a  more pluralistic  view that  could  better  match the
pragmatist attitude?
Richard SHUSTERMAN - The first thing I should say in response is that the article you
mention is not recent. It was written for a 2012 conference that formed part of a
nationally  funded  Polish  project  on  the  history,  value,  and  future  prospects  of
pragmatist  aesthetics,  a  conference  scheduled  to  coincide  with  the  twentieth
anniversary of my 1992 book with that name (whose Polish translation appeared in
1998). In that historical, bio-bibliographical context, my article sought to treat the
following questions. What neopragmatist influences led me from analytic philosophy
to pragmatist aesthetics; how I found the essential roots of pragmatist aesthetics in
classical pragmatism; and why despite the fact the Dewey rejected the notion of a
specific pragmatist aesthetics, my book took that name and how the name became
popular and came to define Dewey’s aesthetics, as it were, malgré lui? It is simply a
fact (embarrassing or not) that what first brought me to pragmatism was not Dewey’s
aesthetics but Rorty’s hermeneutics (despite my disagreements with him). My first
pragmatist  writings  are  on  interpretation  and  evaluation  (Shusterman,  1988a;
1988b). It  is  also  a  fact,  (frankly  confessed  in  that  article)  that  my  book’s  title
“Pragmatist  Aesthetics”  was  not  my own invention.  The title  was  decided by my
editor at Blackwell, who published my earlier (edited) book, Analytic Aesthetics and
insisted that “Pragmatist Aesthetics” would be a good title for an aesthetic sequel, far
better  than  the  vaguely  evocative  title  (“Living  Beauty,  Rethinking  Art”)  that  I
proposed  and  that  got  relegated  to  the  subtitle.  My  editor  was  right;  the  term
“pragmatist  aesthetics”  proved  fruitful  and  multiplied  (to  borrow  the  idiom  of
Genesis),  serving  a  variety  of  enlightening  theories  and  applications,  not  only  in
philosophy but also in several  other disciplines concerned with aesthetics.  I  have
always welcomed such pluralism and diversity in pragmatist  aesthetics,  and have
repeatedly advocated it by pointing to its presence in Emerson, William James, and
Alain Locke, as well as in Rorty, Margolis, Goodman, and others. In the very article
you cite, I insist that pragmatist aesthetic cannot be reduced to a single theory or
captured in a single article “as many authors have contributed to its development in
a variety of disciplines, including the field of somaesthetics that emerged from it”
(Shusterman 2014: 26). As one of the themes of that 2014 article was the pragmatic
power of names, so one of the article’s methods of research involved quantifying (till
the year 2012)  the usage of  that  name “pragmatist  aesthetics” in philosophy and
humanities journals and other research publications available in digital data bases.
The  study  also  included  (for  comparison  and  contrast)  the  amounts  of  usage  of
related  names  like  “pragmatic  aesthetics,”  “pragmatist  esthetics,”  “aesthetics  of
pragmatism” and then it compared such usage before and after the publication of
Pragmatist Aesthetics.  Having recently examined the data since 2012, I am happy to
report that the term “pragmatist aesthetics” has continued to increase in popularity
thanks to the fine work of the many scholars in this field. I hope that Dewey would
not regret that his aesthetic masterwork is now identified with a concept he rejected.
⁂
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Roberta DREON -  Let  us conclude this  interview with a reference to your  latest  research
project, namely the philosophical account of human sexuality that you are developing. Once
more, you have confirmed your courage in putting an unusual, thorny issue at the center of
philosophical debate. We can easily imagine how this latest interest of yours is related to
somaesthetics,  but  what,  if  any,  are  its  connections  with  the  pragmatist  approach  in
aesthetics?
Richard  SHUSTERMAN -  Thanks  for  this  question  and  for  the  interview  in  general.
Cambridge University Press has scheduled, for March 2021, the publication of my Ars
Erotica: Sex and Somaesthetics in the Classical Arts of Love. This book does not propose a
systematic philosophical account of sexuality but rather provides historical, cultural,
and  philosophical  materials  that  I  hope  offer  important  insights  for  a  better
understanding of the rich potential of meaning and beauty in sexual desire and erotic
love. I wish I shared your confidence that the issues of eroticism and sexuality will be
at  the  center  of  philosophical  debate.  There  are  powerful  reasons  to  fear  that
contemporary theorists will largely ignore or reject these issues and my book. Many
today will view the erotic as politically incorrect because inextricably poisoned by
traditions  of  predatory  patriarchy;  others  would  follow  an  earlier  line  of  your
questioning and reject the whole topic of eroticism as essentially privatist and elitist
because of its central somatic concerns. Who can afford to think about improving
one’s lovemaking to make it  richer and more satisfying in terms of aesthetic and
ethical values? Only a privileged minority of the world’s population, critics will say.
Even if  this  contestable claim is  true,  does it  constitute a good enough reason to
exclude the topic from philosophical consideration and ignore improving the lives of
that  (still  numerous)  minority?  Moreover,  could  not  greater  recognition  of  the
aesthetic and ethical values of erotic love help foster progressive thinking to make
more  of  these  values  possible  for  more  people?  Even  in  dark  times,  we  can
contemplate  improving the values  of  shared communicative sensuous pleasure as
building  blocks  for  improved  social  understanding.  Could  not  the  beauty  of  love
provide a microphysics of pleasurable solidarity and emancipatory “somapower” to
help  inspire  utopian  social  reform  (Shusterman  2019b;  Koczanowicz  2020)?  Love,
including erotic love, still  has, I  believe, its inspirational powers. I  know this idea
sounds unrealistically utopian and romantic, but as melioristic hope is central to the
pragmatist tradition, I don’t believe that utopian or romantic pragmatism is a self-
contradictory  position.  For  that  reason,  some  French  theorists  have  critically
characterized my philosophy as juvénile,  while Germans sometimes disparage it as
kindisch. I am not frightened or ashamed of those labels.
There is another reason why many philosophers will ignore the contents of my book.
Its contents do not constitute a familiar topos for contemporary philosophy, despite
Foucault’s  important  work  on  the  history  of  sexuality.  We  have  no  philosophy
journals devoted to eroticism; there is no Review of Erosophy to do what The Review of
Metaphysics does for questions of ontology. For such reasons (as well  as others),  I
often thought of abandoning my project on erotic love; it required far more research
than I initially imagined because I did not want it to be Eurocentric and ahistorical.
The book deals with seven richly complex and prominent premodern cultures that
have significantly shaped our present. That research taught me how ignorant I was,
and how much I still have to learn.
As  for  your  question about  the  book’s  relation to  the  pragmatist  tradition,  I  can
answer most frankly by defining this relation as essential, but essentially negative. It
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is  essential  in  the following  sense.  An  embodied,  meliorist  philosophy  like
pragmatism (and especially a philosophy with an aesthetics celebrating experiences
of consummatory fulfilment) should regard the sexual soma with its needs, drives,
and  joys  of  sexual  satisfaction  as  an  essential  site  for  improving  embodied
experience.  This meliorative cultivation includes improving the ways that diverse
forms of erotic engagement and fulfilment can form an aesthetically and ethically
uplifting communicative experience while  enhancing rather than damaging social
harmony.  Sex  is  an  essential  part  of  life  that  pragmatism,  with  its  embodied
Darwinian heritage, should not neglect. However (and here is the negative element),
the pragmatist tradition does neglect it, perhaps because of the lingering prudishness
of  American  puritan  culture,  or  at  least  of  American  academic  culture.  This
discomfort with the sexual may explain Dewey’s disregard for Freud.  But at  least
Dewey recognized the philosophical  and moral  legitimacy of writing about sexual
ethics, when he nobly defended the realm of academic freedom and the reputation of
Bertrand Russell, who had been banned from teaching at New York’s City College (in
1940) because of his writings on topics relating to sex (Dewey 1988b).
Discomfort with philosophizing the sexual might also have contributed to Rorty’s
anti-somatic  attitude.  In  criticizing  somaesthetics,  he  notes,  for  example,  how
“Foucault’s, Bataille’s, and Deleuze’s discussions of the body leave [him] cold” (Rorty
2001: 156); and these authors are well known for their views on sexuality and desire.
In any case, my resolve to research eroticism crystalized when I saw that William
James (the pragmatist personality for whom I have the most affection) went so far as
to  invoke  what  he  calls  our  “antisexual  instinct,”  describing  it  as  “the  actual
repulsiveness to us of the idea of intimate contact with most of the persons we meet,
especially those of our own sex” (James 1981: 1053-4). I then decided the pragmatist
tradition could use a volunteer to address its neglect of eroticism and sexuality. That
decision reflects my pragmatist desire to do useful philosophical work. One way to be
useful is to work on topics that are largely neglected in academic philosophy but that
seem  important  to  the  problems  of  individuals  and  societies,  and  that  therefore
should have some philosophical significance and merit philosophical attention.
1 This concern for topics that seemed largely neglected by academic philosophy explains
my 1990s work on rap and country music, my early research on somaesthetics and body
consciousness,  and  more  recently  my  theorizing  of  forms  of  eating  and  fashion
(Shusterman 2016b, 2017). If these topics are now receiving more attention, the field of
ars erotica continues to suffer philosophical neglect.  I  know that many philosophers
regard  these  topics  as  frivolous  and  outside  the  bounds  of  philosophy.  But  the
democratic, pluralistic, and embodied spirit of pragmatism provides me some support.
The interdisciplinary nature of this work (Koczanowiz & Małecki 2012) can also take
inspiration  from  the  pragmatist  tradition  (whose  exemplars  were  often  more  than
mere  philosophers:  semioticians,  psychologists,  educators,  political  theorists,
sociologists, and literary critics). I am grateful to find the spirit of pragmatist open-
mindedness continued in this Journal, which has allowed me, once again, to explain my
varieties of pragmatist aesthetics (EJPAP 4:1/2012).
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